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Old and Difficult Grievances:
Examining the Relationship Between
the Métis and the Crown
Jean Teillet*

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1982, Canada took the unique and unprecedented step of giving
constitutional protection to the Aboriginal and treaty rights of the “aboriginal peoples of Canada” in section 35.
35(1) The Aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of
Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.
35(2) For the purposes of this Act, the “aboriginal peoples of Canada” includes the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada.
Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 is unprecedented in two
ways. First, it gives constitutional protection to Aboriginal and treaty
rights. Second, it includes a mixed-blood people, the Métis, within the
definition of the “aboriginal peoples of Canada”. There is no other country in the world that has taken either step.
It has been noted by the Supreme Court of Canada that the inclusion
of section 35 in the Constitution Act, 1982 was the culmination of a long
and arduous struggle by all the Aboriginal peoples of Canada.1 Indeed,
the three national Aboriginal organizations of the day, the National
Indian Brotherhood, the Native Council of Canada and the Inuit Tapirisat, worked together to achieve the entrenchment of Aboriginal and

*

Ms. Teillet practises with the law firm of Pape and Salter with offices in Toronto and
Vancouver.
1
R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, at 1105, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49 [hereinafter
“Sparrow”].
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treaty rights in the Constitution.2 At the same time, several nonAboriginal bodies were also calling for constitutional reform that included protection for Aboriginal peoples. By the fall of 1980, there was
public support for the idea of entrenching Aboriginal rights in the Constitution. The Canadian Bar Association, the Pepin-Robarts Task Force
on Canadian Unity, a Joint Senate-House of Commons Committee on
the Constitution, and several church groups all called for the constitutional protection of Aboriginal rights.3
The political debates in both the House of Commons and in the
Senate calling for constitutional protection for Aboriginal peoples and
their rights are illuminating. There was a consensus that the Aboriginal
peoples of Canada had “old and difficult grievances” that required reconciliation.4 The debates reflect a unanimous recognition that government had ancient legal obligations to Aboriginal peoples and that the
relationship with the Crown and the practices of the past needed to
change.
The move to give the rights of Aboriginal peoples constitutional
protection was clearly intended to be a substantive change in the relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown. The constitutional
debates reflect this and show that section 35 was to be “a turning point
in the status of native peoples in this country”, “a renewal of our commitment to the native peoples”, an “historic recommendation of equality
of constitutional standing of the Aboriginal peoples with other communities in Canada” and “a political watershed in the lives of the Aboriginal people in Canada”. Finally, that including section 35 in the
Constitution would mean that, “no government or individual will again
2
Note that these three groups represented the Indians, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada in the constitutional negotiations of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The national bodies
that represent these three distinct Aboriginal peoples in 2004 are the Assembly of First
Nations, the Métis National Council, and the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami. The former Native
Council of Canada is now known as the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples, which claims to
represent a mixture of off-reserve, status, and non-status Aboriginal individuals. This claim is
disputed by the Assembly of First Nation, which claims to represent all Indians whether on or
off reserve, and by the Métis National Council which claims to represent all members of the
Métis Nation.
3
Hogg, Canada Act 1982 Annotated (1982), at 1-3, 69 and 81-83; Purich, The Metis
(1988), at 167-169; Romanow, “Aboriginal Rights in the Constitutional Process” in Boldt and
Long (eds.), Quest for Justice (1985), at 73-74.
4
Hansard of the House of Commons and Senate of Canada 1980-1982, re inclusion of
s. 35, statement by Senator Austin in Senate Debates, at 3317.
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be able to put aside or disregard the rights of Canada’s original peoples”
because Parliament has taken the “opportunity of redressing their claims
in the Constitution and to provide a legal basis for it”.5
That was 1982. It is now more than 20 years since that monumental
constitutional change was made. Since 1982, the Supreme Court of
Canada has brought down more than 35 judgments with respect to the
Aboriginal and treaty rights of Indians. With respect to the Métis, the
first judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada, R. v. Powley, was
handed down in 2003.6 At this point, with a substantial body of Aboriginal constitutional law now in place, and a new Supreme Court of
Canada decision that applies that body of law to the Métis, it is worth
asking whether section 35 is providing a resolution to the old and difficult grievances.

II. WHAT ARE THE OLD AND DIFFICULT GRIEVANCES?
The old and difficult grievances all stem from the problematic relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown. What was the
relationship just prior to 1982? It was unbalanced, to say the least. The
Crown held the power, the lands, the resources, the courts, the law enforcement and the money. By 1982, Aboriginal peoples held, for the
most part, only the equities.
The inclusion of section 35 in the Constitution Act, 1982 was intended to even out the power relationship. But perhaps with the hindsight of 20 years we can see that, in 1982, little thought appears to have
been given as to exactly how section 35 would restrain the powers of the
Crown. Even less thought appears to have been given as to how the
Crown would react to this encroachment and that it might act to protect
its authority and jurisdiction.
In argument before the Supreme Court of Canada from 1984 to
2004, federal and provincial Crowns have consistently resisted the conclusion that constitutional space for Aboriginal peoples means any re-

5

Hansard, id., Senate Debates, at 1921-1922 and 3318; and see H.C. Debates, at 3889,
4044-4045, 7448, 7519-7521, 9403, 13276 and 13280.
6
R. v. Powley, 2003 SCC 43, [2003] S.C.J. No. 43 [hereinafter “Powley”].
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straint on Crown jurisdiction or authority.7 For 20 years, the Crown has
argued any one or more of the following: that section 35 is merely of a
preambular character; that section 35 undermines the balance of federalism; that section 35 prevents government from governing; that the
courts ought not to inquire into provincial decision making; that the
Crown cannot discharge its burden; that the Crown’s duty is not engaged; that the province is not in a position to …; that the duty stops
short of …; that their obligations are political; not legal; not enforceable; not fiduciary; not constitutional — no, not us, or at the very least
not yet.8
With respect to the Métis, the litany of denial is slightly different.
For Métis, the Crown’s complaint is that it does not know who the Métis
are; that the Métis are merely individuals with some Aboriginal ancestry; that their rights are derivative or dependant on Indian rights; that
while Indians may have Aboriginal rights, Métis have none; that while
Indians may have Aboriginal title, Métis have none; that Métis organizations are not legally capable of representing them; that they are not
collectives; that the government has no obligations to Métis; that they
are a provincial responsibility (from the federal government); that they
are a federal responsibility (from the provincial governments); that there
may be Métis in that province, but not in this province; that wherever
and whoever those people might be they are not rights holders; they are
not really Aboriginal or at least not Aboriginal enough; and anyway
they all disappeared when Louis Riel was hanged in 1885. The Métis
are, according to the Crown, non-existent or non-ascertainable as a
people, and certainly not anyone or any entity that engages the recognition or any obligations of any of the governments in Canada.
From this litany we can see at least two fundamental issues with respect to the Métis that the Crown relies on in order to continue its course
of denial. Both create roadblocks to the meaningful implementation of
section 35. The first issue is this — does the Crown have constitutional

7

In particular, see Crown arguments as set out in Guerin v. Canada, [1984] 2 S.C.R.
335 [hereinafter “Guerin”]; Sparrow, supra, note 1; Delgammuukw v. British Columbia,
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108; Powley, supra, note 6.
8
A variation of this paragraph was argued orally by Louise Mandell before the Supreme Court of Canada on March 26th 2004 in Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of
Forests), [2002] 2 C.N.L.R. 121, [2002] B.C.J. No. 378 (C.A.) [hereinafter “Haida Nation].
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and/or fiduciary obligations to the Métis? If so, how is it required to
implement those obligations?
The second issue is this — when do the Crown obligations to the
Métis arise? The Crown has consistently argued that any fiduciary obligations it might have do not arise until there is a court-determined, site
specific Aboriginal right. With respect to the Métis, the Crown denies
any fiduciary relationship or obligations under any circumstances.
This paper will examine both of these issues in light of another issue
— how and when is the Crown to implement a constitutional or fiduciary relationship with the Métis — an Aboriginal people it has rarely
acknowledged and no longer knows.

III. THE CROWN’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MÉTIS
The common law of Aboriginal rights developed in the context of
the colonial experience in North America and has always been part of
our constitutional law. The doctrine of Aboriginal rights is Canadian
common law and it defines the constitutional relationship between the
Crown and Aboriginal peoples.9 McLachlin J. explained this relationship in her decision in Van der Peet,
These arrangements [in the Royal Proclamation] bear testimony to the
acceptance by the colonizers of the principle that the aboriginal peoples
who occupied what is now Canada were regarded as possessing the
Aboriginal right to live off their lands and the resources found in their
forests and streams to the extent they had traditionally done so. The
fundamental understanding – the grundnorm of settlement in Canada –
was that the Aboriginal people could only be deprived of the sustenance
they traditionally drew from the land and adjacent waters by solemn treaty
with the Crown, on terms that would ensure to them and their successors a
replacement for the livelihood that their lands, forests and streams had
10
since ancestral times provided them…

Unfortunately, the division of legislative powers and property set
out in the Constitution Act, 1867 was not sufficient to ensure that gov9

Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights” (1983) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727, at 732
and 736-37.
10
R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, at para. 272, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, per McLachlin
J. (as she then was) dissenting on other grounds [hereinafter “Van der Peet”].
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ernments kept faith with the grundnorm on which the settlement of the
country was based. It is for this reason that when the Constitution Act,
1982 was enacted there was a political consensus to include section 35.
In 1984 and in 1990, the Supreme Court of Canada, in Guerin and
Sparrow, set out the fundamental framework for analysis of section 35.
The court held that the approach to be taken with respect to interpreting
the meaning of section 35(1) is derived from general principles of constitutional interpretation, principles relating to Aboriginal rights, and the
purposes behind the constitutional provision itself. They said that section 35 was to be construed in a purposive way.
The Court understood that the relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown had to be addressed. It was not enough to address
the specific events that gave rise to the Court action. The Court held that
Aboriginal peoples and the Crown were in a fiduciary relationship and
in light of that relationship, ways and means had to be found to protect
Aboriginal peoples within the Canadian legislative, regulatory and policy regimes. The choice of fiduciary law was explained in Guerin,
[Where there is a fiduciary obligation] there is a relation in which the
principal’s interests can be affected by, and therefore dependent on, the
manner in which the fiduciary uses the discretion which has been
delegated to him. The fiduciary obligation is the law’s blunt tool for the
control of this discretion.11

In Guerin, the Crown argued that if there was a trust, it was, at best,
a political trust, enforceable only in Parliament and not a true trust,
enforceable in the courts.12 The Court expressly disagreed and held that
even though the Crown’s obligations could not be defined as a trust that
did not mean that the Crown owed no enforceable duty to the Indians.
As the Court explained six years later in Sparrow, the constitutional
relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown required a
broad application of fiduciary law,
The sui generis nature of Indian title, and the historic powers and
responsibilities assumed by the Crown constitute the source of such a

11
Guerin, supra, note 7, at 28, per Dickson J. (as he then was) quoting with approval
from Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation (1975) 25 U.T.L.J. 1, at 7; Wewaykum Indian Band
v. Canada, 2002 SCC 79, at para. 80, [2002] S.C.J. No. 79 [hereinafter “Wewaykum”].
12
Guerin, supra, note 7, at 9 and 21, per Dickson J.
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fiduciary obligation ... the Government has the responsibility to act in a
fiduciary capacity with respect to aboriginal peoples. The relationship
between the Government and aboriginals is trust-like, rather than
adversarial, and contemporary recognition and affirmation of aboriginal
rights must be defined in light of this historic relationship. Section 35(1) is
a solemn commitment that must be given meaningful content. Yet, we
find that the words “recognition and affirmation” incorporate the fiduciary
relationship referred to earlier and so import some restraint on the exercise
of sovereign power. In other words, federal power must be reconciled with
federal duty … Such scrutiny is in keeping with the concept of holding the
Crown to a high standard of honourable dealing with respect to the
aboriginal peoples of Canada.13

The purpose of all of the Supreme Court findings with respect to the
relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown has been to
facilitate reconciliation. Reconciliation requires three things — a working relationship, restraint on the exercise of governmental powers, and
the creation of constitutional space that allows Aboriginal peoples to
exercise and enjoy their rights and title. But section 35 did not give
Aboriginal peoples the authority to protect their rights and interests
themselves, nor did it alter the distribution of legislative powers. It did
not give absolute status to Aboriginal and treaty rights. Instead, the
Constitution Act, 1982 simply “recognized and affirmed” Aboriginal
rights in section 35. It is the Supreme Court of Canada that has read
recognition and affirmation as incorporating constitutional restraints on
the Crown’s exercise of its legislative and administrative powers.
The constitutional recognition afforded by [section 35] therefore gives a
measure of control over government conduct and a strong check on
legislative power. While it does not promise immunity from government
regulation … it does hold the Crown to a substantive promise.14

The restraint, the “strong check on legislative power”, has been articulated in terms of broad principles — fiduciary relationship, justification and
consultation. These are not the legal mechanisms for defining the existence
of the Aboriginal right. Rather, they are the legal mechanisms for defining
and enforcing the constitutional restraints on governments.

13
14

Sparrow, supra, note 1, at 1108; Wewaykum, supra, note 11, at paras. 74-79.
Sparrow, supra, note 1, at 1010.
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From the vantage point of 2004, it seems that the inclusion of section
35 in the Constitution Act, 1982 may not be having the effect intended by
its creators. It does not seem to be a renewal of our commitment to the
native peoples, nor has it been an historic recommendation of equality of
constitutional standing of the Aboriginal peoples with other communities
in Canada.
Basic scientific theory holds that to every action there is always opposed an equal reaction.15 If this theory applies to government, then we
should not be surprised that section 35 seems to have had the effect of
entrenching the Crown in an equal and opposite position of denial
thereby creating an adversarial state of siege as between Aboriginal
peoples and the Crown. This is particularly true of its relationship with
the Métis. A relationship that can best be discerned by its absence.
The Crown often argues that it does not know who the Métis are.
Yet both federal and provincial governments have taken few steps, if
any, to find a contemporary answer to this complaint. Such willful ignorance should be unacceptable in a fiduciary. While, the Supreme Court
of Canada has held that not all actions of the Crown trigger its fiduciary
obligations, it has recently affirmed that the principle “applies to the
relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples”.16 On this basis
it seems logical to presume that a fiduciary has at least one positive
obligation in the absence of a triggering event — the obligation to identify
the people with whom it has a relationship. If the Crown, as a fiduciary,
fails to carry out this most basic activity surely it cannot then use its ignorance as an excuse to deny its obligations or to defeat rights. Indeed the
Supreme Court said precisely this in Powley:
The appellant advances a subsidiary argument for justification based on
the alleged difficulty of identifying who is Métis … The development of a
more systematic method of identifying Métis rights-holders for the
purpose of enforcing hunting regulations is an urgent priority. That said,
the difficulty of identifying members of the Métis community must not be
exaggerated as a basis for defeating their rights under the Constitution of
Canada.17

15
16
17

Isaac Newton, Principia Mathematica (1687).
Wewaykum, supra, note 11, at para. 83.
Powley, supra, note 6, at para. 49.
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This contemporary claim of ignorance with respect to the identity of
the Métis is convenient and new. In the past the government has quite
adequately identified the Métis. Indeed, numerous counts of the Métis
were carried out in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. That is how
scrip was distributed to thousands of Métis on the Prairies. Treaty commissioners made it a usual practice to count the Indians and the Métis.
Hudson Bay Company records and census takers also identified Métis.
The real problem is that government neglected to keep its records up to
date. It appears to have made its decision to stop acknowledging the
Métis in the belief that two events extinguished the very existence of the
Métis people — the distribution of scrip and the hanging of Louis Riel.
While scrip may have had some legal effect on the Aboriginal title of
the Métis, and the hanging of one man, Riel, certainly acted as a strong
deterrent to political action, neither of these actions had the legal or
physical effect of eradicating an entire people.18 The Métis people are
still here, as an Aboriginal people.
The Supreme Court of Canada in Sparrow held that the Crown’s fiduciary relationship is with the Aboriginal peoples of Canada.19 It was
open to the Court, in view of the fact that Sparrow was about the fishing
rights of Indians, to limit the fiduciary relationship to Indians and not
use the more inclusive term Aboriginal peoples. Further, the Court
stated that it was the term “recognize and affirm” from section 35 that
imported the fiduciary relationship. In view of this, and when combined
with the Court’s admonition in Powley, it would seem likely that the
fiduciary relationship, which applies to the “aboriginal peoples of Canada”, includes the Métis.
Can the Crown legitimately claim ignorance about the difficulties of
identifying the Métis? The historical record shows that the Crown has,
in the past, identified Métis when it saw fit. The record also shows that
18

For more on scrip see: Sprague and Frye, Genealogy of the First Métis Nation
(1981); see also R. v. Morin and Daigneault, [1996] 3 C.N.L.R. 157, [1996] S.J. No. 262
(Prov. Ct.), affd [1998] 1 C.N.L.R. 182, [1997] S.J. No. 529 (Sask. Q.B.), in which the court
considered the question of the effect of scrip on Métis harvesting rights. In that case the court
held that scrip was silent on hunting and fishing, did not meet the clear and plain extinguishment test, and therefore did not extinguish Métis hunting and fishing rights. For more on the
defects in the trial of Louis Riel see: Bumsted, Louis Riel v. Canada: The Making of a Rebel
(2001); and see also Olesky, Louis Riel and the Crown Letters (February, 1998) Canadian
Lawyer.
19
Sparrow, supra, note 1, at 1108.
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much of the current difficulty with identification of the Métis is a direct
result of Crown law and policy. Having noted that the Crown itself may
be to blame for the identification uncertainty, we are still left with questions. What are the identification difficulties? What does “Métis” mean?
Who is included? Can the Crown continue to use this excuse to deny
Métis recognition?

IV. THE COMPLEX REALITY OF MÉTIS IDENTIFICATION
In law, prior to 1982 there were different names for all of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada. At the beginning of the 21st century we use
the terms First Nations, Inuit and Métis. Throughout most of the 19th
and 20th centuries these same people were known as Indians, Eskimos
and Half-breeds. None of these terms accurately reflect the cultural
societies of the peoples they purport to describe. For example, “Indian”
is a legal term that includes many distinct cultures – Mohawk, Cree,
Tlingit, etc.
Since 1982, Indians have been gradually adopting the term “First
Nations” and at the same time reclaiming their own language names.
For example, the Tlicho were formerly known in English as the Dogribs. The Inuit were previously known as “Eskimos” but are also “Indians” within the meaning of section 91(24) of the Constitution Act,
1867.20
The term “Métis” now replaces the term “half-breeds”. Under the
previous English-language designation, “half-breeds” were recognized
by the British imperial government and by the government of Canada.
Generally speaking, “half-breeds” were seen by government as individuals with some claim to Aboriginal rights and title, but were not recognized
as an Aboriginal people. Using the term “half-breed” implies that one is
an individual who has “mixed-blood” or is “half-Indian”. The very term
“half-breed” or “mixed-blood” has much less political significance
than terms such as “the Métis” or “the Métis Nation” because such

20

Reference re British North America Act, 1867 (U.K.), s. 91, [1939] S.C.R. 104.
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individuals are considered to be distantly connected to Indian nations
and any rights they have would derive from that connection.21
There is a distinction between the legal terms used to describe Aboriginal peoples and the terms they self-ascribe. The legal terms reflect
the universal practice of outside naming, or recognition by others, of the
existence of a people who are different. The term “Métis” is unique in
that it is a legal term and self-ascribed in the west-central parts of Canada.22 This is unlike the use of the term “Indian”, which is a legal term
and not self-ascribed. The term “half-breed” reflects the concept of
outside naming by English speaking historians, lawyers and settlers. The
Cree also practiced outside naming by calling the Métis apeytogosan —
meaning half-people. The Cree also coined another term for the Métis
— otepayemsuak — meaning “the independent ones”. To the Cree, the
Métis were otpayemsuak because their communities were distinct from
both the non-Indian and Indian communities and because most Métis
considered the treaty and reserve system to equate to a loss of their
highly valued independence.
Although the term “Métis” and “Métis Nation” were self-ascribed in
the early 19th century, the Métis have also had many names attributed to
them by outsiders — half-breed, chicot, freemen, bois-brulé, michif, the
flower beading people, the independent ones, the road allowance people
and the forgotten people – to name just a few.
To outsiders, “Métis” is generally unhelpful as a defined term.
There are several reasons for the confusion the term engenders. First,
confusion results because the term is often erroneously applied to two
distinct groups of people. It is used to refer to all individuals who have
mixed Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal ancestry. These same individuals
are sometimes called non-status Indians, a term that reflects the fact that
they are not registered under the Indian Act. Métis also is the selfascribed name of a distinct Aboriginal people — the historic Métis Nation located in central, western Canada.23
21
Sanders, Aboriginal Peoples and the Constitution (1981) 3 Alta. Law Rev. 410, at
420. See previous use of the term “half-breeds” in the Manitoba Act, 1870, S.C. 1870, c. 3,
R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 8, and in the Dominion Lands Act, S.C. 1870, c. 31, s. 125(e).
22
The term “Métis” was a legal term in Canada prior to its use in section 35. It is used
in the French version of the Manitoba Act, 1870.
23
For more on the history of the Métis Nation see: Report of the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples, vol. 4, c. 5 (1996) [hereinafter “RCAP Report”]; Dickason, Canada’s
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The second source of the confusion arises from the fact that in the
late 1960s and the early 1970s, the Canadian public became more
sensitive to the language of naming. It is at this time that the term
“half-breed” began to be understood as a pejorative term and subsequently fell into disrepute and disuse. It was also at this time that the
term Métis began to be used to include all persons of mixed Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal ancestry.
A third source of confusion about Métis identity arises from the relationship between Indians and Métis and the changing definition of
“Indian” in the Indian Act.24 In 1985, largely in response to the political
efforts of non-status Indians and Métis, the government introduced Bill
C-31. This amendment to the Indian Act reinstated many thousands of
Indians who had been struck off the Indian Act registry. Prior to regaining their status as Indians, many had been calling themselves Métis.
Indeed, many have both Indian and Métis ancestry. Bill C-31 had a
considerable effect on the identity politics of Indians and Métis in Canada. Many of those who were reinstated will not be legally able to pass
their Indian status on to their children and so, while for at least for the
first generation, Bill C-31 substantially increased the numbers of Indians
and decreased the numbers of Métis, their children or grandchildren will
likely revert to pre-1985 status.
Another contributing factor is that the federal government accepts
jurisdiction for Indians on reserve, but all governments in Canada deny
jurisdiction for off-reserve Indians and Métis.25 This has contributed to
the tendency to lump these two separate peoples together. This jurisdic-

First Nations: A History of Founding Peoples from Earliest Times (1994), at 306-318; Siggins, Riel: A Life of Revolution (1994); Sprague, Canada and the Métis, 1869-1885 (1988);
Purich, The Métis (1988); Sealey and Lussier, The Métis: Canada’s Forgotten People (1975).
24
Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5.
25
Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (1997), at 27-24. Also see Chartier, “Indians:
An Analysis of the Term They Used in s. 91(24) of the British North America Act, 1867”
(1978-1979) 43 S.L.R. 39; Morse and Giokas, “Do Métis Fall Within Section 91(24) of the
Constitution Act, 1867?” in Aboriginal Self-Government: Legal and Constitutional Issues
(1995); McMahon and Martin, “The Métis and 91(24): Is Inclusion the Issue?” in Aboriginal
Self-Government: Legal and Constitutional Issues (1995).
For contra see Flanagan, “The Case Against Métis Aboriginal Rights” (1983) 9 Can.
Pub. Pol’y 314; Schwartz, “First Principles: Constitutional Reform with Respect to the
Aboriginal Peoples of Canada” (1986).
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tional denial was looked on with disfavor in R. v. Grumbo, where
Wakeling J.A., in his dissenting judgment had this to say:
I view it as unfortunate that there appears to be a considerable amount of
tactical manoeuvring involved in the positions taken by the federal and
provincial authorities with respect to issues of this nature …
… This province probably felt obliged to maintain the position it had
consistently taken that the Métis are a federal responsibility … This
position the Province has adopted leads to the judicial temptation to
conclude it cannot blow hot and cold … I refrain from such temptation
only because I have decided the position taken by the Province is, in all
likelihood, one thrust upon it by the historical inability of governments to
agree on the extent of the responsibility owed to the Métis and which level
of government has that responsibility. It is a political rather than a legal
foundation which they stand upon …
It is of interest that the Federal government was made aware of this appeal
and chose not to become involved. It too may have had the difficulty of
denying responsibility for the Métis since it is their position the Métis
were not included as an Indian in s. 91(24) and at the same time
acknowledging the existence of certain rights of the Métis now recognized
in s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. These inconsistencies in the position
of governments reinforce my view that the judicial process should give
but scant attention to the positions they have adopted as they appear to be
tainted by considerations beyond those which are properly relevant to a
judicial determination.26

Prior to the creation of reserves, both Indians and Métis shared territory, usually peacefully. Although their homes and camps were usually
adjacent to but separate from those of the Indians, the Métis and Indians
usually shared harvesting areas and maintained close family ties. After
treaties were entered into, Indians gradually began to relocate to reserves, a process that was accelerated as laws requiring attendance at
schools began to be enforced. After the creation of the reserves, some
but not all Métis also moved onto the new Indian reserves, married into
and became part of the Indian culture. However, many who moved onto
the reserves maintained their identity as Métis despite being legally
registered as “Indians”. Indeed this was the story revealed by Gwynneth
26
R. v. Grumbo, [1998] 3 C.N.L.R. 172, at paras. 83-87, [1998] S.J. No. 331, revg
[1996] 3 C.N.L.R. 122, [1996] S.J. No. 504 (Q.B.).
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Jones, the Crown’s historical expert during the Powley trial. The Métis
who went to live on the Garden River reserve near Sault Ste Marie
never merged with the Ojibway residents of the reserve.27
In the 1890s, the Ontario government gave former Magistrate Borron a mandate to determine ways to decrease the numbers of persons on
the treaty annuity lists. Following the new Indian Act of 1876, which
declared for the first time that Indians were to be determined according
to their father’s heritage, Borron claimed that the Métis, who for the
most part are the descendents of Indian women, had no legitimate
claims to either land, annuities or treaty rights. In very frank language
Mr. Borron stated that:
Had he [W.B. Robinson] intended to include, or ever anticipated — that
French Canadians and French Half-breeds or other breeds of like
fecundity and longevity — were to be recognized as Indians by the
Department of Indian Affairs and permitted to draw Annuities which his
Province would be called upon to pay a man of the Hon. W.B. Robinson’s
sagacity and shrewdness would surely have inserted a clause in the treaty
to protect the Province from such an imposition.28

As a result of Borron’s report, the “breeds of like fecundity and longevity” were removed from the reserve and lost their status under the
Indian Act. Many, including the Powleys’ ancestors, simply returned to
the nearby Métis community that persisted in the vicinity.
Métis rarely take on Indian status in order to become “Indians” culturally. Rather, they usually choose Indian status in order to take advantage of the benefits that are available to those recognized as Indians.
Olaf Bjornaa gave a poignant illustration of this in Powley. At trial, Mr.
Bjornaa was asked why he finally accepted Bill C-31 status when he
said he’d identify as Métis until the day he died. Mr. Bjornaa told the
court that he had been a commercial fisherman all his life. Recently he’d
had an accident on his boat. As a result he couldn’t fish any more and
could no longer make a living from his fishing. While he retained his
commercial fishing licences he was denied any social assistance. Since
fishing licences can be inherited or used by other family members, he
didn’t want to give them up. But Mr. Bjornaa was raising his grandchil27

Powley, 2003 SCC 43, at para. 35, [2003] S.C.J. No. 43.
Borron Reports of 1891 and 1892 as cited in the Report of Gwynneth Jones (1998)
prepared for the trial R. v. Powley. Ms. Jones was the Crown’s historical expert.
28
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dren and he now required over $300 a month in medicine. Taking Bill
C-31 was a pragmatic necessity. Mr. Bjornaa needed access to the
health benefits available to status Indians but denied to Métis.29
The issue of Métis identity is sensitive, has many layers and has always been complicated. Identity can also mean different things in different contexts. So with all of the above in mind we can ask the question
— who are the Métis?30 There appear to be at least three answers to this
question: (1) Métis are individuals with mixed European and Aboriginal
blood; or (2) Métis are an Aboriginal people; or (3) Métis are those who
describe themselves as such in order to claim the protection of section
35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
The first category is relatively self-explanatory. Anyone with any
Aboriginal ancestry, no matter how remote, can self-identify as Métis
and many programs and services are granted on the basis of selfidentification. However, mere self-identification is not sufficient for the
purposes of claiming constitutional rights. This is because the recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal rights under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 is reserved for the “aboriginal peoples of Canada”. The
word “peoples” is used three times in section 35. It means that unless an
individual can also prove membership in a Métis collective, she will not
likely be able to claim section 35 protection for her rights. This line of
reasoning can be seen in recent case law.31 It has now been affirmed by
the Supreme Court of Canada in Powley:
The term “Métis” in s. 35 does not encompass all individuals with mixed
Indian and European heritage; rather, it refers to distinctive peoples who,
in addition to their mixed ancestry, developed their own customs, way of
life, and recognizable group identity separate from their Indian or Inuit
and European forebears.32

29

Powley trial transcripts, volume 4, “Testimony of Olaf Bjornaa”.
For more on this question see: Bell, “Who Are the Métis People in Section 35(2)?”
(1991) Alta. L. Rev. 29.
31
R. v. Howse, [2000] B.C.J. No. 905 (Prov. Ct.), revd [2002] B.C.J. No. 379 (S.C.);
leave to appeal to B.C.C.A. granted on March 12, 2003; R. v. Daigle, [2003] 3 C.N.L.R. 232,
[2003] N.B.J. No. 65 (Prov. Ct.); R. v. Castonguay, [2003] 1 C.N.L.R. 177 (N.B. Prov. Ct.);
R. v. Chiasson, [2002] 2 C.N.L.R. 220, [2001] A.N-B. No. 87 (Prov. Ct.); R. v. Nunn, unreported, April 17, 2003 (B.C. Prov. Ct.); R. v. Hopper, [2004] N.B.J. No. 107 (Prov. Ct.).
32
Powley, 2003 SCC 43, at para. 10, [2003] S.C.J. No. 43.
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With respect to the second category, in Powley, the Supreme Court
of Canada discussed the fact that there may be more than one Métis
people in Canada:
The Métis of Canada share the common experience of having forged a
new culture and a distinctive group identity from their Indian or Inuit and
European roots. This enables us to speak in general terms of “the Métis”.
However, particularly given the vast territory of what is now Canada, we
should not be surprised to find that different groups of Métis exhibit their
own distinctive traits and traditions. This diversity among groups of Métis
may enable us to speak of Métis “peoples”, a possibility left open by the
language of s. 35(2), which speaks of the “Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples
of Canada”.33

With respect to the third category, since the inclusion of the Métis
as one of the “aboriginal peoples of Canada” in section 35, the term
Métis is now a legal term, much like the term Indian. Some Aboriginal
people, who do not culturally identify as Métis, are now claiming the
constitutional protection of the legal term Métis. An example of this
kind of claim can be found in the factum of the Intervener, the Labrador
Métis Nation, at the Supreme Court of Canada in Powley, in which they
stated that the “Labrador Métis” use the constitutional descriptor of
“Métis” even though it was an Inuit culture.
Will the courts agree that the constitutional protection of the legal
term “Métis” is available to those who are not culturally identified as
Métis? The Supreme Court of Canada addressed this issue in R. v. Blais.
In that case the question was whether Métis were “Indians” for the purposes of the Natural Resources Transfer Agreements (NRTA). The Court
said that the Métis are not included in the legal term “Indians”. The
Court looked to the common language understanding of the term “Indian” at the time the NRTA was enacted — 1930. The Court said that it
would not “overshoot” the actual purpose of the right and that the constitutional provision was not to be interpreted as if it was enacted in a
vacuum:

33

Id., at para. 11.
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… the terms “Indian” and “half-breed” were used to refer to separate and
distinguishable groups of people in Manitoba from the mid-19th century
through the period in which the NRTA was negotiated and enacted.34

In view of this analysis, it seems likely that groups who culturally
identify as “Indians” or “Inuit”, would not be “Métis” for the purposes
of section 35 because they would not meet the plain language test set
out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Blais.
Despite the complexities of Métis identification set out above, historically the Métis were part of the political, social and legal fabric of
Canada since at least 1763. The recognition of the Métis and their inclusion in section 35 is not a new recognition. In fact, it is part of a long
history of government recognition of the Métis. The Crown has consistently recognized that Métis were part of the Aboriginal landscape and
dealt with them in recognition that they had Aboriginal rights. However,
with a few exceptions, government dealt with Métis as individuals and
refused to deal with the Métis as a collective.
Prior to the 1830s, the British imperial government treated the Métis
like all other Aboriginal people in North America. For example, the
Métis shared in the annual distribution of presents given by the Crown
to Aboriginal allies. Originally instituted by the French and later continued by the British, the giving of presents was an important symbolic
means of cementing the friendship and alliance of Aboriginal peoples
and the Crown. Métis warriors fought along with other Aboriginal warriors as allies of the British Crown in the War of 1812.35
After 1830, British policy in Canada, with respect to the Métis began to shift. The government, in its policies and law, began to separate
Métis from Indians. This shift had only one motivation — government’s
desire to decrease its financial obligations to Aboriginal people by reducing the sheer numbers of those who were considered to be Aboriginal. In 1846, the Bagot Commission recommended that:
Crown financial obligations were to be reduced … and only persons listed
as band members would be entitled to treaty payments … [recommending
that] the following classes of persons be ineligible to receive these
payments; all persons of mixed Indian and non-Indian blood who had not

34
35

R. v. Blais, 2003 SCC 44, at para. 34, [2003] S.C.J. No. 44.
Report of Dr. Victor Lytwyn (1998) prepared for the trial in Powley.
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been adopted by the band; all Indian women who married non-Indian men
and their children …36

The policy was reiterated by the Pennefather Commission of 1858,
which had a mandate to find effective methods of decreasing government financial obligations to Indians. It recommended that one of the
most efficient ways to decrease these costs would be to cut the Métis off
the treaty lists.37
In Manitoba in 1869, Canada negotiated with the Métis as a collective. That negotiation resulted in the Manitoba Act, 1870, which set
aside 1.4 million acres “… for the benefit of the families of the halfbreed residents”.38 In 1875, in the Addendum to Treaty Three by the
Half Breeds of Rainy Lake/Rainy River, the Métis adhered to the treaty
as a collective. In the numbered treaties on the Prairies and in the
Northwest Territories, government officials met with Métis and Indians
at the same time to discuss the treaty, but then used different mechanisms for each. Indians received treaty. Métis received scrip, issued
pursuant to the Dominion Lands Act.39 In each of these circumstances
the Métis sought to have their Aboriginal claims recognized. They were
acknowledged as having Aboriginal claims, although for the most part,
they were dealt with as individuals and treated differently than Indians.
This is why the recognition of the Métis in section 35(2) is not a
new recognition. And because the recognition of the Métis is not new,
their inclusion in section 35 cannot be interpreted as merely a political
compromise. The inclusion of the Métis in section 35 is part of a contin-

36

RCAP Report, supra, note 23, at vol. 1, at 268.
Id.
38
The Manitoba Act, 1870, S.C. 1870, c. 3, R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 8, s. 31; RCAP
Report, supra, note 23, at vol. 4, c. 5, at 305-309, 403-407, 413-22; Dumont v. Canada
(Attorney General), [1990] 2 C.N.L.R. 19, [1990] S.C.J. No. 17, revg (sub nom. Manitoba
Métis Federation Inc. v. Attorney General of Canada), [1988] 3 C.N.L.R. 39, [1988] M.J. No.
327 (C.A.), revg [1987] 2 C.N.L.R. 85, [1987] M.J. No. 108 (Q.B.). See also Dumont v.
Canada (Attorney General) (Man. C.A.), [1992] 2 C.N.L.R. 34, [1991] M.J. No. 621 (C.A.),
revg [1991] 3 C.N.L.R. 22, [1990] M.J. No. 660 (Q.B.) [hereinafter “Manitoba Métis Federation”]. For an extensive discussion of the background, negotiations and implementation of the
Manitoba Act, 1870, see Chartrand, Manitoba Métis Settlement Scheme of 1870 (1991).
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Dominion Lands Act, S.C. 1879, c. 31, s. 125(e). For a discussion on the scrip distribution system, see RCAP Report, supra, note 23, at 407-408, 422-30. For discussions on
Métis participation within treaties, see RCAP Report, supra, note 23, at 341-43. Also see map
of Métis scrip commissions in Historical Atlas of Saskatchewan (1999), at 61-62.
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uum begun much earlier, implemented as part of the doctrine of Aboriginal rights as articulated in the Royal Proclamation, and affirmed by
government actions and in statutes, treaties and constitutional instruments.
What is new about section 35 is the solid commitment to deal with
the Métis as an Aboriginal people from 1982 on. The government’s
failure to consistently treat the Métis as a people was the foundation of
the old and difficult grievances that required reconciliation with the
Métis. The very survival of the Métis into the 21st century is a testament
to their collective strength and aspirations. It was in 1763 with the
Pontiac Uprisings that the Métis first began to assert their Aboriginal
rights. These assertions continued with the Battle of Seven Oaks in
1816, the Sayer trial in 1849, Mica Bay in 1849, Red River in 1870, the
Half-breed Addendum to Treaty #3 in 1875, at Saskatchewan (Duck
Lake, Fish Creek and Batoche) in 1885, and again in the events leading
up to 1982.40
As settlement moved west, and the government concluded treaties
with the Indians, the Métis faced the continuing challenge of maintaining their collectivity.
… Increasing immigration and development consumed their historical
lands at a distressing rate. Increasingly restrictive hunting laws, with
which they were required to comply despite their Aboriginal heritage,
made it more and more difficult to follow traditional pursuits. While they
were never well off, Indian people at least had their reserves and benefited
from various social services provided by the government of Canada. Not
so the Métis … Game was scarce, prohibitively expensive fishing licences
were required, and white settlement was spreading remorselessly. The
majority of the Métis were reduced to squatting on the fringes of Indian
reserves and white settlements and on road allowances. The ‘independent
ones,’ who had been the diplomats and brokers of the entire northwest
were now being referred to as the ‘road allowance people’.41

This excerpt from the RCAP Report specifically discusses the Alberta Métis. Yet, Alberta is the only province that has maintained some

40
For Pontiac Uprisings see Testimony of Dr. Lytwyn, Powley Trial Transcripts, vol. 3,
at 3-151; For Mica Bay see Testimony of Dr. Ray, Powley Trial Transcripts, vol. 2, at 124288. For other Metis assertions see RCAP Report, supra, note 23, at vol. 4, c. 5.
41
RCAP Report, supra, note 23, at vol. 4, c. 5, at 227.

310

Supreme Court Law Review

(2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d)

affirmative action with respect to the Métis. Governments by and large
have refused to acknowledge the existence of the Métis as a people. The
Métis were intentionally ignored or displaced and became known as the
“forgotten people”. With no protected collective lands, the Métis culture
was constantly threatened by wave after wave of settlers with an agricultural lifestyle. Yet, despite all of this, the Métis survived. They
slipped from public awareness and as with all Aboriginal peoples in
Canada, they lived for decades in relative obscurity. Canadians grew
into their maturity as a country during this time but with respect to their
memories of the Métis “down they forgot as up they grew”.42
Some people think that the Metis Nation history ended on the Batoche
battlefield or the Regina gallows. The bitterness of those experiences did
cause the Metis to avoid the spotlight for many years, but they continued
to practise and perserve Metis culture and to do everything possible to
pass it on to future generations.43

The story told by Olaf Bjornaa at trial — that he and his sister were
turned away from the reserve school (because they were not Indians)
and the non-Aboriginal school (because they were Indians), is indicative
of the Métis place in Canadian society – “You’re almost a person in
your own homeland.”44
However, while the Métis may have been forgotten by the public
and government, they did not disappear. The Métis quietly continued to
persevere and in the 1960s, along with Indian and Inuit organizations,
they began to re-emerge with new political organizations to speak for
their rights.
In Sparrow, the Chief Justice stated the reasons why it was necessary
to protect Aboriginal rights in the Constitution. He quoted MacDonald J.
when he stated that we “cannot recount with much pride the treatment
accorded to the native people of this country”.45 The same kind of historical reasons underlie the decision by the federal government and nine
provinces to expressly include Métis and their Aboriginal and treaty
42

Cummings, “anyone lived in a little how town”, in Gary Geddes (ed.), 20th Century
Poetry & Poetics (1969), at 108.
43
Powley, 2003 SCC 43, at paras. 24-27, [2003] S.C.J. No. 43, at para. 24-27; and see
also RCAP Report, supra, note 23, vol. 4, c. 5, at 227.
44
R. v. Powley, [1999] 1 C.N.L.R. 153, at para. 83, [1998] O.J. No. 5310 (Prov. Ct.).
45
Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, at 1103, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49.
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rights in the Constitution Act, 1982. O’Neill J. perhaps stated it best
when he held that:
The purposes underlying the aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by
s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 relate to both prior occupation, and
reconciliation. What, however, are the reasons underlying the protection
that s. 35(1) gives, and what is the basis for the special protection that
aboriginal peoples generally, and Métis people specifically, have within
Canadian society? Surely, at the heart of s. 35(1), lies a recognition that
aboriginal rights are a matter of fundamental justice protecting the
survival of aboriginal people, as a people, on their lands. The Métis have
aboriginal rights, as people, based on their prior use and occupation as a
people. It is a matter of fairness and fundamental justice that the
aboriginal rights of the Métis which flow from this prior use and
occupation, be recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982.46

The Ontario Crown, in Powley urged the court not to treat the Métis
as a people but rather as individuals who are simply the descendents of
Indians, with their rights and existence determined by their Indian ancestors, their Indian blood quantum and their Indian lifestyle. The court
rejected this submission,
This theory in effect would deny to Métis their full status as distinctive
rights-bearing peoples whose own integral practices are entitled to
constitutional protection under s. 35(1).47

In fact there would have been no reason to include the Métis in section 35 if they were to be treated as individuals who are part Indian. The
recognition — that the Métis are a distinct people — is one of the most
fundamental reasons that required the inclusion of the Métis in section
35. The failure of governments to recognize and affirm the Métis as a
people is the old and difficult grievance of the Métis. Government’s
predominant pattern — treating Métis as individuals — is exactly what
is needed and still needs to change.

46
47

R. v. Powley, [2000] O.J. No. 99, at para. 16, [2002] O.J. No. 99 (S.C.J.).
Powley, 2003 SCC 43, at para. 38, [2003] S.C.J. No. 43.
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V. WHEN DOES THE CROWN HAVE TO ACT?48
The relationship between the Crown and the Métis first came
before the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Powley. It is in Powley that
the Court affirmed that the Métis are an Aboriginal collective with their
own distinctive practices, customs and traditions. It set out a test for
identifying the section 35 harvesting rights of the Métis. The Court held
that the purpose for including Métis in section 35 was to enhance “their
survival as distinctive communities”49 and to “protect practices that
were historically important”.50
The inclusion of the Métis in s. 35 represents Canada’s commitment to
recognize and value the distinctive Métis cultures … which the framers of
the Constitution Act, 1982 recognized can only survive if the Métis are
protected along with other Aboriginal communities.51

The duty to protect is a positive duty on the Crown. After all, noninterference may be achieved by inaction, but protection cannot be implemented in the abstract or in the negative. Protection also cannot be
achieved by the enactment of policies, regulations or laws that affect,
but do not address Métis rights. As the Supreme Court of Canada noted
in Sparrow, Aboriginal peoples are justifiably suspicious of “neutral”
rules that in reality place insurmountable obstacles that bar the exercise
of their rights.52
The Crown argues that it has no constitutional or fiduciary obligations to Aboriginal peoples generally, and no obligations to Métis specifically, unless and until there is a court finding. By this, the Crown
means a specific finding of a specific right for each and every separate
Aboriginal people.

48

The theories on Crown obligations with respect to consultation and accommodation
that appear in this paper were developed with Arthur Pape and first appeared in the factum of
the plaintiffs in Taku River Tlingits First Nation v. Tulsequah Chief Mine Project, [2002]
B.C.J. No. 155, at 171-73 (C.A.), affg [2000] B.C.J. No. 1301 (S.C.) [hereinafter “Taku River
Tlingits”] and also in the factum of the Intervener, First Nation Summit in Haida Nation v.
British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2002] 2 C.N.L.R. 121, at para. 37, [2002] B.C.J. No.
378 (C.A.).
49
Powley, 2003 SCC 43, at para. 13, [2003] S.C.J. No. 43.
50
Id.
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In support of its argument, the Crown takes the position that the
constitutional obligations of section 35 are limited to Sparrow-type
situations. In that kind of case, a defence against a prosecution, the
courts have defined one of the Crown’s duties as a duty to justify their
actions. But the Supreme Court of Canada has never said that the
Crown’s duty only arises after a court has proclaimed the existence of
an Aboriginal right, nor has it said that court determinations are the only
source of the Crown’s duties to Aboriginal peoples. On the contrary, the
Supreme Court has always proceeded on the basis that the duty existed
before the Court’s determination of the right and that the Crown has to
justify its infringement as of the time of the offence, not as of the time
of the court judgment.
The Supreme Court also said, in Adams, that it is unconstitutional
for the Crown to adopt an unstructured discretionary regime that risks
infringing Aboriginal rights in a substantial number of applications.53
This is hardly the kind of statement that can only apply to after-the-fact
justification. Rather, it speaks to the general obligations of the Crown
and is a positive duty. It arises without the adjudication of specific
rights.
The discussion of the Crown’s duty to consult in Delgamuukw also
reflects the view that Crown obligations arise prior to the adjudication
of Aboriginal rights or title:
… the fiduciary relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples
may be satisfied by the involvement of Aboriginal peoples in decisions
taken with respect to their lands. There is always a duty of consultation …
The nature and scope of the duty of consultation will vary with the
circumstances. In occasional cases, when the breach is less serious or
relatively minor, it will be no more than a duty to discuss important
decisions that will be taken with respect to lands held pursuant to
Aboriginal title. Of course, even in those rare cases when the minimum
acceptable standard is consultation, this consultation must be in good
faith, and with the intention of substantially addressing the concerns of the
Aboriginal people whose lands are at issue. In most cases, it will be
significantly deeper than mere consultation. Some cases may even require

53
R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101, at para. 54, [1996] S.C.J. No. 87 [hereinafter
“Adams”].
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the full consent of an Aboriginal nation, particularly when provinces enact
hunting and fishing regulations in relation to Aboriginal lands.54

Sparrow, Adams and Delgamuukw therefore, cannot be reconciled
with the position that the Crown’s obligations do not arise until particular section 35 rights are determined. Practically speaking, if the Crown
has no obligations to Aboriginal people until specific rights are adjudicated, Aboriginal peoples have no constitutional protection. Under such
an interpretation, Aboriginal peoples will be forced to flood the courts
because that would be the only way to stop the Crown from charging
Aboriginal people with harvesting violations, alienating Crown lands
and resources, or authorizing impacts to land-related Aboriginal interests. This cannot be correct and no one can afford this enormous litigation agenda.
This position, that the Crown has no obligations prior to a courtdetermined right, contains two errors. First, it prioritizes justification
and infringement over recognition and affirmation. Second, it assumes
that constitutional and fiduciary duties only arise in the context of justification. This focus on justification instead of the affirmative purpose of
section 35 is clearly misguided. The justification scheme cannot be used
to determine the existence of Aboriginal rights. Justification reflects one
fact only, that such rights are not absolute. In this way it is similar to
section 1 of the Charter. Just as section 1 does not define the nature of
governments’ obligations under the Charter, the Crown’s obligations
pursuant to section 35 also cannot be defined through the lens of justification.
As noted in Delgamuukw, the Crown has, at minimum, an obligation to act “with the intention of substantially addressing the concerns of
the Aboriginal people whose lands are at issue”.55 In Taku River Tlingits, the B.C. Court of Appeal found that the duties of the Crown were
triggered by the assertions of the Aboriginal peoples and did not require
a court finding. The court said that to find otherwise would have the
effect of robbing section 35(1) of much of its constitutional significance:

54
55
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In my opinion, nothing … provides any support for the proposition that
Aboriginal rights or title must be established in court proceedings before
the Crown’s duty or obligation to consult arises. 56

The B.C. Court of Appeal in Haida Nation stated the obligation even
more forcefully:57
So the trust-like relationship and its concomitant fiduciary duty permeates
the whole relationship between the Crown, in both of its sovereignties,
federal and provincial, on the one hand, and the aboriginal peoples on the
other. One manifestation of the fiduciary duty of the Crown to the
aboriginal peoples is that it grounds a general guiding principle for s.
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.
It would be contrary to that guiding principle to interpret s. 35(1) … as if
it required that before an aboriginal right could be recognized and
affirmed, it first had to be made the subject matter of legal proceedings;
then proved to the satisfaction of a judge of competent jurisdiction; and
finally made the subject of a declaratory or other order of the court. That
is not what s. 35(1) says and it would be contrary to the guiding principles
of s. 35(1), as set out in R. v. Sparrow, to give it that interpretation.

The Ontario Court of Appeal expressed a similar opinion in Powley.
In that case Sharpe J. said,
I do not accept that uncertainty about identifying those entitled to assert
Métis rights can be accepted as a justification for denying the right …The
basic position of the government seems to have been simply to deny that
these rights exist, absent a decision from the courts to the contrary… The
government cannot simply sit on its hands and then defend its inaction
because the nature of the right or the identity of the bearers of the right is
uncertain.58

The Supreme Court has not yet brought down a judgment that considered whether the Crown’s duties are triggered in the absence of a
court finding, although Sparrow, Adams and Delgamuukw suggest there
is such a duty.59 The Sparrow justification approach cannot exhaust the

56

Taku River Tlingits, supra, note 48, at 171-73 (B.C.C.A.).
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role of section 35 in the relationship between the Crown and the Aboriginal peoples of Canada.
The courts in Taku River Tlingits and in Haida held that the
Crown’s duties were triggered by threats to vulnerable Aboriginal interests rather than the adjudication of rights. The Powleys indeed argued
just this trigger in their argument with respect to the necessary change to
the contact test for Métis. Before the Supreme Court, the Powleys submitted that the relevant time to determine the rights of the Sault Ste
Marie Métis community was the time just prior to 1850, when the
Crown’s obligations arose pursuant to the Royal Proclamation. The
historical record showed that the Crown had authorized non-Aboriginal
third party activities just prior to 1850 when control was shifting away
from the Aboriginal peoples in possession. This was the time when,
with respect to the Sault Ste Marie Métis community, the Crown’s fiduciary obligations arose and when its obligations to implement the equitable principles in the Royal Proclamation crystallized.
This approach mirrors the practices of the Crown in making treaties
to implement the equitable principles of the Royal Proclamation. Historically, treaty making involved no exhaustive analysis to determine the
practices, customs or traditions of the Aboriginal people at contact, nor
was there any attempt to determine eligibility based on length of occupation.60 On the contrary, the Crown properly entered into treaty with
the Indians who were in possession at the time. Each time the Crown
implemented the equitable principles from the Royal Proclamation —
beginning in the Upper Great Lakes with the Robinson Treaties and
continuing west with the numbered treaties — it negotiated when it
wanted to access lands and resources for settlement, mining or forestry
development or in order to build transportation corridors.
It is suggested that this is the appropriate trigger for Crown obligations — when it seeks to authorize activities that stand to affect Aboriginal interests. Once that trigger has been activated, the Crown is
under an obligation to effectively protect Aboriginal communities and
the lands and resources on which they rely. This trigger and the resulting obligations would apply to all Aboriginal peoples — including the
Métis.
60
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VI. HOW DOES THE CROWN HAVE TO ACT?
Once the trigger has been activated, the Crown is obligated to undertake all activities with a view to ensuring that it substantially addresses the concerns and interests of Aboriginal peoples. This
necessitates consultation and accommodation. The Crown’s duty is not
satisfied unless it fulfils both.
The Supreme Court said, in Delgamuukw, that there is always a requirement to consult when Aboriginal rights may be infringed.61 Consultation is constitutionally mandated although it will usually be
triggered by a pending exercise of statutory power. The decision in
Adams goes further, requiring statutory regimes in respect of land and
resources to provide rules for complying with the duty:
… In light of the Crown’s unique fiduciary obligations towards aboriginal
peoples, Parliament may not simply adopt an unstructured discretionary
administrative regime which risks infringing aboriginal rights in a
substantial number of applications in the absence of some explicit
guidance. If a statute confers an administrative discretion which may carry
significant consequences for the exercise of an aboriginal right, the statute
or its delegate regulations must outline specific criteria for the granting or
refusal of that discretion which seek to accommodate the existence of
aboriginal rights …62

Consultation has two parts. It is intended to fulfil government’s obligation to inform Aboriginal peoples and to inform itself. This includes
informing itself and the affected Aboriginal peoples about the significance of any actions government is about to undertake, the effects of
such actions and how those effects might be mitigated. Because the
ecological, cultural or economic impacts on Aboriginal peoples are not
always obvious, Aboriginal people have a role to play in providing that
information and analysis.63 They can only do this effectively if government is genuinely seeking to inform itself.
61

Delgamuukw, supra, note 54, at para. 168.
Adams, supra, note 53, at para. 54.
63
For discussions of practices and institutions that sustain a minority people and its culture, see Mahe v. Alberta, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342, [1990] S.C.J. No. 19; Lalonde v. Ontario
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Accommodation is intended to fulfil the Crown’s obligation to
exercise its authority so as to protect Aboriginal peoples. Effective
accommodation measures will vary with the circumstances but the goal
of accommodation is not to trade off or surrender Aboriginal interests
and rights. Rather, the goal is to ensure Aboriginal interests and rights
will survive and can be effectively exercised. At minimum, accommodation requires the Crown to refuse to authorize proposals that would
either undermine or endanger Aboriginal interests, especially the interests needed to sustain them as an Aboriginal people.
If the Crown chooses to exercise its legal authority in the absence of
substantive consultation with the Aboriginal collective or in the absence
of an agreement on accommodation, any authorization that it grants will
suffer from a fundamental legal defect. This would be so if the Crown
has not fulfilled its duty to consult and accommodate according to the
standards of loyalty and prudence to which fiduciaries are held.64
Whether the Crown has fulfilled its duty to consult and accommodate will not depend on initiatives that are alleged to accommodate the
Aboriginal interest, or whether the Crown has considered Aboriginal
concerns, taken some mitigation steps, or acted rationally as opposed to
arbitrarily. The duty is not procedural it is substantive. The fulfilment of
the duty depends on whether the Crown substantially addressed the
interests of the Aboriginal peoples.

VII. THE COMPLEXITIES OF CONSULTATION WITH THE MÉTIS
With respect to the Métis, it is suggested that the Crown has the
same consultation obligations that it has to all other Aboriginal peoples.
It must take steps to inform the Métis about its pending actions. And it
must inform itself about how its actions might affect the Métis collective.
With respect to how the government is to fulfill its consultation obligations, three issues have arisen since Powley that show the complexities of consultation with the Métis. First, with whom is the government
obligated to consult — who represents the Métis qua Métis? Second, is
64
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a Métis collective synonymous with a physical community? Third, is
there an obligation on each Métis individual to provide provincial governments with evidence that meets the Powley test prior to exercising a
Métis harvesting right?
As a general principle, the government’s consultation obligation
must be directed to the Aboriginal peoples, as a collective, because
Aboriginal rights are collective rights. Consultation with individual
members of the collective can only inform government about that individual’s interests. It cannot fully inform government about the collective
interests or aspirations of an Aboriginal people.
As with consultation implemented with Indians, consultation with
Métis must begin with their elected representatives. This is, admittedly,
a more complicated task for Métis than for Indians because Métis do not
live in discrete physical communities equivalent to reserves. Métis people in any given region are rarely synonymous with a physical town,
village or city. This is because the Crown did not relocate Métis into
geographically distinct areas as it did when it relocated Indians onto
reserves. The Métis continue to live, as most Aboriginal people lived
prior to the creation of reserves, scattered throughout their traditional
territory. Some live on reserves, some live adjacent to reserves, some
live in the bush, some live in cities, towns or villages. Statistics show
that the Métis have always been a highly mobile people and it is interesting to note that this characteristic has not changed. Indeed the latest
census data shows that the Métis continue to move more than average
Canadians.65 Under these circumstances, consultation with Métis collectives is complicated but not an insurmountable task.
Can the Crown fulfil its consultation obligation with respect to the
Métis by consulting with local municipal representatives? While it will
obviously be important for the Crown to engage in consultations with
municipal representatives, this would likely not fulfil the Crown’s consultation obligation with respect to the Métis and their section 35 rights.
Municipal representatives have no jurisdiction, authority or mandate to
deal with the Métis qua Métis. They have limited jurisdiction pursuant

65
Statistics Canada reports that according to the 2001 census, “23% of the population
that identified themselves as Métis changed residences in the year prior to the census, compared with only 14% of the non-Aboriginal population”. See the Statistics Canada web site at
<http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/products/analytic/companion/abor/groups2.cfm>.
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to their governing statute and within the geographic territory of their
municipality. But municipal representatives have no mandate or authority to represent Métis with respect to the exercise of Métis rights or title.
Municipal representatives are particularly inappropriate when one considers that elected municipal representative may not even be Métis and
that the exercise of many Métis rights, such as hunting, fishing and
trapping, take place well outside municipal boundaries.
Would the Crown’s consultation obligation be fulfilled by consultation with Métis organizations? For Indians, the Crown instituted Chief
and Council on reserves and gradually these bodies have replaced the
traditional forms of governance and become recognized in law as the
official representatives for all purposes including consultation. The
Crown has never established similar political or legal bodies for the
Métis. As a result, the self-created, ballot-box elected Métis organizations are the only entities in existence that have the structure and mandate to represent Métis qua Métis. 66
Governments are extremely reluctant and have refused to recognize
the authority of these Métis created organizations for consultation purposes.67 Governments question the Métis organizations’ membership
rules, question their authority and deny them recognition, resources and
respect. In view of the fact that the Crown has neglected to maintain its
own Métis records, has not adequately funded these organizations to
enable them to develop verifiable records, and in the absence of any
other viable entities, it is difficult to understand how the Crown can
fulfill its constitutional and fiduciary consultation obligations without
consulting Métis organizations.
The fact that Métis organizations are legally capable of representing
the Métis for the purposes of their constitutional rights has been before
the courts in Manitoba in the case of Manitoba Métis Federation v.
66
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Canada (previously known as Dumont).68 The federal government
moved to have the claim struck and a majority of the Manitoba Court of
Appeal agreed. O’Sullivan J.A. dissented:
The problem confronting us is how can the rights of the Métis people as a
people be asserted. Must they turn to international bodies or to the
conscience of humanity to obtain redress for their grievances as a people,
or is it possible for us at the request of their representatives, to recognize
their people claims as justiciable?
In my opinion … the rights of the Métis people must be capable of being
asserted by somebody. If not by the present plaintiffs, then by whom?

The Supreme Court unanimously overturned the Manitoba Court of
Appeal decision, which has the effect of reinforcing O’Sullivan J.A.’s
finding that the Manitoba Métis Federation is an appropriate legal entity
to represent Métis with respect to their Métis rights. It would seem logical that if the Manitoba Métis Federation can sue on behalf of the Métis
with respect to their Métis rights, the Crown should also consult with
them in respect of those same rights when it contemplates activities that
stand to affect them.
In other developments post-Powley, evidentiary issues have arisen.
The Supreme Court of Canada set out a test for ascertaining whether an
individual can claim the protection of section 35 for Métis harvesting
rights. Despite the Court’s emphasis on the fact that Métis are a people
with collective rights, and despite the Court’s statements with respect to
the urgent priority that must be afforded to standardizing Métis identification, provincial governments have made few moves in this regard and
are refusing to recognize identification cards issued by Métis organizations. Instead, government is placing the burden of proof on each individual Métis who seeks to exercise her harvesting rights and in the
absence of such proof is laying charges.
The quantity and cost of providing such voluminous evidence cannot be underestimated. Under such a demand and prior to exercising
their harvesting rights, each individual Métis must provide a genealogy
complete with supporting documentation. Each individual Métis must
provide a full history of her Métis collective, complete with proof of the
68
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date of the assertion of effective control by the colonial government.
Each individual Métis must also provide proof that she is an active participant in the Métis community. Presumably such evidence could be
adduced by evidence of participation in Métis social events, or in known
Métis cultural activities such as jigging, playing the fiddle, beading or
speaking Michif. Under these circumstances provincial natural resource
officers become prosecutor, judge and jury. They determine whether
there is a Métis collective, whether that collective has harvesting rights,
the date of effective control, the sufficiency of genealogical evidence
and whether the cultural connection to the Métis community is sufficient
in terms of depth and length. This cannot be correct and if it is, the Métis cannot afford any more such “victories”.
Surely this cannot be what the Supreme Court of Canada contemplated
in establishing the Powley test. Yet Crown prosecutors are demanding all
of this evidence from each individual who claims Métis harvesting
rights in the new world post-Powley. It is a rather stunning reversal of
the strong statements of a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada. The
prosecutorial lens, combined with the government’s own abysmal ignorance about the Métis is being used to do exactly what the court said
should not happen. Governments are not working with Métis organizations as an “urgent priority” to consult with the Métis collectives or to
accommodate them in a way that substantially seeks to identify Métis
rights holders. Rather the “urgent priority” seems to be to charge individual Métis harvesters when they cannot discharge the impossible
evidentiary burden the Crown has imposed under the guise of the Powley test. This is not a burden carried by any other Aboriginal peoples
who seek to exercise their harvesting rights.
The Crown’s actions since Powley defeat what the Supreme Court
of Canada said was the purpose of section 35 — to “protect practices
that were historically important”69 and in effect have eviscerated the
Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment in Powley.
It is suggested that the better way to proceed would be for government to consult with Métis representatives and negotiate agreements
that allow individual Métis to exercise their harvesting rights and provide the certainty that government needs. Until such agreements are in
place, no prosecutions should be laid. The Crown should not take ad69
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vantage of the uncertainty and negotiation period by charging individual
Métis for exercising the harvesting rights that have so recently been
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada. Such restraint would be in
keeping with the concept of holding the Crown to a high standard of
honorable dealing with respect to the Métis.

VIII. CONCLUSION
As can be seen from the post-Powley events, the Crown is continuing its past practices and the very relationship that section 35 was
supposed to change. The Crown focus remains on individual Métis
rather than with the Métis collective. Plus ca change plus c’est la
meme chose. It seems that the old and difficult grievances of the Métis
remain to be reconciled.

